Transitional justice is a politically fraught endeavour,
where the conflicts of the past are continued through legal and political
wrangling. TJ raises the questions: who
is justice for – victims or local/international community? What does justice mean – TJ in its broadest
sense is concerned with criminal trials, truth and reparations; whereas
international criminal justice is focussed on narrow criminal trials.
The main problem for societies emerging from political
violence or authoritarian regimes is the multifaceted nature of conflict and
how it affects both individuals and the fabric of society. Hayner (2001) puts forward the notion that
these societies are at a ‘crossroads’ and asks what should be done with the
recent history full of traumatised victims and perpetrators; with the fear, the
silence, and the denial? There is a
tension between those who are in left with the reins of power and those who
were trampled underfoot by previous regimes.
At this ‘crossroads’ the question is put: do you bring the perpetrators
to justice and punish them or is it better to forget about what happened and
just draw a line under the past? For
Minow (1998) the answer may lie somewhere in between: between vengeance and
forgiveness.
Hayner argues that justice is difficult to pursue especially
in societies where the peace has been negotiated and there are no clear winners
or losers. This is where the concept of
transitional justice comes in. The
United Nations (2004) defines transitional justice as ‘…the full range of
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms
with the legacy of large scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability,
serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.
This definition has raised expectations for many victims: expectations
that have proven difficult to realise.
The aims are highly aspirational and they tend to leave societies with
more questions than answers. Who is actually
going to be held to account; to whom is justice actually served; and does
reconciliation naturally follow?
The need to include victims in the transitional process has
now been recognised as an important aspect of transitional justice and victimology. Karstedt (2010) notes that today, the
presence of victims is acknowledged as a necessary precondition for
establishing truth and accountability, and the objective of transitional
justice is defined by doing justice to and for the victims. Victims were ‘seminal’ in the establishment
of TJ (Karstedt, 2010).
One of the main problems that victims face is the culture of
silence and denial that the people and power structures, which were part of
their victimisation, have over them. For
many victims the prominent discourse is that they should just stay silent, bury
their vindictive urges, and accept impunity for fear of reigniting the
violence. This utilitarian discourse is
concerned with stabilising the fragile transition from violence to peace: the
suffering of the few should not outweigh the benefits for the many.
Ad hoc international Tribunals came to the fore following
the mass killings in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. They were heralded by proponents as noble
attempts to deliver justice to the direct victims of gross human rights
violations. The outcomes have had a
mixed reception. This may be down to the
approach taken by the Tribunals themselves.
The judicial approach could best describe the response to
the genocide in Rwanda which occurred during the summer of 1994. The extent and nature of the genocide was
such that it ‘seriously affected the social tissue of Rwandan society’ according
to Vandeginste (2003). To repair this
damage a mammoth response would be required.
The international community demanded that the alleged perpetrators be
prosecuted. Orenlichter (1991) speaks to
the ‘duty to prosecute’ as being sacrosanct to the rule of law. In contrast, Mallinder and McEvoy (2012)
argue that this ‘duty’ is not clearly defined especially when examining
intranational conflicts.
Nevertheless, the United Nations created the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) only a matter of months after the events in
the expectation that it could end the ‘cycle of impunity’ by rendering justice
and determining guilt for the horrific crimes committed; while also ‘contributing
to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace’.
This expectation that any such trial could lead to peace and
reconciliation was ambitious.
Vandeginste points to a number of factors that may explain how it failed
to live up to these expectations: one being the fact that the process took too
long to complete; ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. The
ICTR was also operating in the atmosphere of ongoing gross human rights
violations of which it had no mandate to investigate. This compounded the notion that the ICTR was
only interested in justice for the victors of the 1994 period as gross human
rights violations before and after this period were not included in the
mandate. Moffett argues that this narrow
temporal jurisdiction limited victim recognition.
Furthermore, the ICTR did not take into consideration the
local expectations of how justice should be administered: this was decided by the political elites in the
United Nations Security Council. The Tribunal
operated on the basis of the Western style courtrooms with due process at its
heart and sought to protect the two party adversarial system. There was no room for victim-witnesses to
give their own personal accounts of suffering; instead the emphasis relied upon
the witnesses keeping to the facts as laid out in the charges. Only the Prosecutor had the power to decide who would be called to
give evidence and, as such, many victims felt excluded.
When victims are excluded from the process it can undermine
the healing effects and as Karstedt (2010) argues justice can only be felt in
an abstract way. Danieli (2006) concurs
with this and views these types of trials as a missed opportunity for healing:
with survivors receiving little meaning from the process. Victims are now acknowledged as symbolic
stakeholders who participation is vital to the legitimacy of the process.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) is
a further example of the international response to mass atrocity. Minow argues that the ‘rule of law’ was subverted
in some ways by this Tribunal due to the fact that it relied on political
actors and developments for its operations, resources, and decisions. The main problem was that many of the indictments
were levelled at political elites who remained in power. There was therefore no incentive for the
warring parties to come to the negotiating table as their guilt was
presupposed. Furthermore, the
international response was viewed as a cynical political effort to retain some
legitimacy after its inadequate response to the slaughter itself.
Moffett (2014) argues that despite developments in
international law, victimology and human rights law, such tribunals did not
substantially deliver justice to victims; and that justice for victims is
primarily rhetoric used to justify punishment and to legitimise their own
existence. Victims are considered
objects, with justice being done on the basis of their suffering, without
recognising them as subjects having their own needs and interests. According to the President of the ICTY, the
overseers of both tribunals i.e. the United Nations Security Council, neglected
the issue of reparations (which could have addressed many of these needs)
thereby hindering the wider goals of the Tribunal in delivering justice to
victims. Moffett concludes that the
Tribunals were unable to deliver reparations due to a lack of legal basis in
their respective Statutes, capacity, and political will. Their mandate was to prosecute rather than
provide a wider conception of justice to victims.
So what next for the victims? For many the next step is finding the truth
in the expectation that the truth will heal: individually and on the macro
societal level. In the transitional
justice paradigm this has come to mean ‘Truth Commissions’. Hayner defines truth commissions as
officially sanctioned top-down temporary bodies designed to investigate
patterns of past abuses. Again like
trials they are viewed as collective efforts to deal with past abuses with the
aim of possible reconciliation. While
cynically viewing the nomenclature as an Orwellian irony Minow (2002) concedes
that truth commissions can expose and document torture, murders and other human
rights violations that would otherwise be ignored and denied.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
is an oft-cited example of a response that gave victims a voice through a mass
collection of personal testimony. It was
hoped that the TRC would deliver some sort of justice to the victims through an
acknowledgement of their credibility and a symbolic recognition of their
suffering, which had once been denied by the Apartheid regime. However, Minow argues that the TRC denied
those who sought retributive justice by placing an emphasis on a contrived
expectation of forgiveness from the survivors.
The victims were almost ‘forced’ to forgive the perpetrators in the
spirit of national reconciliation. The
victims became pawns in the challenging realpolitik of transition.
The truth is not always seen as a noble aim within the
politics of transitional societies. In
certain cases, where metaconflict is strong, calls for truth and justice are
categorised as weapons. Taking the case
of the transitional process in Northern Ireland, there has been, to date, no
concrete agreement on whether a bona fide truth commission could even
exist. According to Lundy and McGovern
(2001), the truth itself has been branded as a Republican Trojan Horse by many
in the Unionist community: to be used as a stick with which to beat the British
state. However, many victims of state
violence view the actions of the British state, on the subject of
accountability, as an example of ‘memory politics’: of state power imposing a
paradigm of ‘organized forgetting’. Lundy and McGovern point to a lack of political and interpersonal trust,
which was inherent during the conflict, as dangerously permeating the
transition to peace.
Furthermore the lack of a master-narrative on the nature of
the conflict feeds this distrust. One
community, the unionists, continue to deny any wrongdoing by the state while
the other side, the nationalists, feels that their suffering is not recognised
or acknowledged. The politics of memory
and truth are highly contested and difficult to deal with. As a result the demands of realpolitik
require that the past is deliberately left untouched.
However, the reality is that legacy issues continue to seep
out of the political vacuum and are only dealt with in, what Bell (2002) calls,
a piecemeal fashion. Lundy (2010) is
concerned that such an ad hoc approach has increased the sectarian divide
between the two communities and further contributed to the socioeconomic
deprivation that plagues certain disadvantaged areas.
Previous attempts to deal with the past in Northern Ireland
now sit on shelves gathering dust: waiting to be taken down and rehashed; only
to then fall prey to the lack of political will to implement them. Boilerplate reports such as Bloomfield;
Eames/Bradley; Haass/O’Sullivan; and Stormont House await activation. Procrastination and the interweaving of
legacy issues with other intractable problems such as welfare reform have
rendered these report and agreements stillborn.
A cynic could easily conclude that this approach suit many of the actors
who would rather keep truth and justice on the long finger.
Paradoxically, a more obvious response to injustice in the
form of the restorative notion of reparations can also get mired in the
political tensions of transitional societies.
By definition reparations are designed to repair that which has been
damaged. These can be symbolic in nature
manifested in the form of memorials and commemoration; or material responses
through compensation or improved access to health and social services, states
Minow.
The challenges facing reparations arise from many
quarters. One being: who gets access and
who is denied? The very definition of
victimhood is contested in many transitional societies. Smyth (2008) points to the political dynamic
of Northern Ireland’s negotiated ‘peace’ as an aggravating factor in who are
ascribed victim status; and the implications of being denied this status.
Certain political parties and victims groups have
continually attempted to change the current definition of victimhood, as set
out by the UK government, to exclude perpetrators of human rights abuses who
were also victimised. The current
definition recognises human suffering as the main qualification for
victimhood. The proposed changes would
bring in moral responsibility as a disqualification and only the innocent
‘ideal victims’, as Bouris calls them, deserve recognition. The logical conclusion is that some bereaved
families could be excluded from access to reparations due to the actions of
their deceased relatives.
According to Minow (1998) the aim of reparations is to help
victims move beyond anger and a sense of powerlessness. Taking away victimhood status and removing
access to reparations could compound this: leading to future resentment;
further perpetuating the cycle of hatred, from which transitional societies are
seeking to escape.
Gready (2014) questions the reach of transitional justice
and proposes the notion of transformative justice. While not seeking to dismiss
or replace transitional justice there is a focus on radically reforming its
politics, locus and priorities. It
entails a shift in focus from the legal to the social and political and from
the state and institutions to communities and everyday concerns. Transformative justice is not the result of a
top down imposition of external legal frameworks or institutional templates,
but more of a bottom up understanding and analysis of the lives and needs of
populations. Transitional societies
could attempt to implement a combination of top down and bottom up approaches
to fit their situation and hopefully this will embed long term peace and
reconciliation.
It is clear that the available responses offered by what has
become known as transitional justice may lack some of the necessary qualities
to bring about real reconciliation and lasting peace. This may not be the fault of the mechanisms
themselves per se, as responsibility for applying them lies with those who are
left with the reins of power during the transition and beyond. Dealing with the aftermath of gross human
rights violations is a mammoth task for all involved. These societies need strong and honest
leadership. Leadership, not just in the
government, but at all strata of society, including victims and perpetrators,
that will carry society with them on the journey to peace.
Transitional justice is a noble aim which hopes to bring
truth, justice, and accountability to victims but it continues to get mired in
the political in-fighting that beset such societies. Transitional societies need to learn from
previous attempts and build upon them to suit their own needs in the hope that
they can transform into places where peace and reconciliation is achievable and
long lasting.